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**EVASION AND RECOVERY: COMBATANT CINC'S DILEMMA**

**BY**

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**Evasion and Recovery: Combatant CINC's Dilemma**

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## **ABSTRACT**

AUTHOR: Lieutenant Colonel (P) Charles W. Higbee  
TITLE: Evasion and Recovery: Combatant CINC's Dilemma  
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project  
DATE: 10 April 2000      PAGES: 23      CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

Each combatant CINC's challenge is to determine how much time and resourcing to give an evasion and recovery (E&R) effort when the primary focus is winning a possible MTW. The dilemma is that evasion and recovery efforts are extremely dangerous and difficult and require an extraordinary amount of detailed planning, training and effort at the tactical level. When considering this investment of resources and for what might coldly be assessed as very little return at the strategic level, the commander faces a difficult dilemma. This paper focuses on the commitment of all commanders, the historical perspective, agency responsibility, terminology, challenges and possible solutions to a CINC's dilemma. For a more complete understanding of the problem, the discussion will encompass elements from the tactical to the strategic level.



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## EVASION AND RECOVERY: COMBATANT CINC'S DILEMMA

Our personnel recovery abilities are not just critical to the pilot (or any American service member) on the ground, although at that moment he or she is very committed to personnel recovery, but also to our country.

This [recovery] commitment is rooted in our values as Americans, and in the bonds forged between those under fire. It is founded on the fundamental truth that soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines fight, and sometimes die, not only for their flag or the Constitution, but in the final analysis, for their buddies. Part of this bond among warriors is the promise not to leave a comrade behind on the battlefield. A promise that extends to a shipmate at sea and a wingman who gets hit deep behind enemy lines [sic].

—General Hugh Shelton, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General Shelton's remarks to the Department of Defense Personnel Recovery Conference in October, 1999 address an essential part of each military Service's culture. Each combatant Commander in Chief's (CINC's) challenge is to determine how much time and resourcing to give an evasion and recovery (E&R) effort when the primary focus is winning a possible Major Theater of War (MTW). The dilemma is that evasion and recovery efforts are extremely dangerous and difficult and require an extraordinary amount of resourcing, detailed training, planning, and orchestration at the tactical level. When considering this investment of resources for what might coldly be assessed as very little return at the strategic level, the commander faces a difficult dilemma. This paper analyzes the commitment of commanders using historical perspective, along with agency responsibility, terminology, and challenges with possible solutions to this dilemma. For a more complete understanding of the problem, the discussion will encompass elements from the tactical to the strategic level.

### COMMITMENT

Traditionally, every commander and leader, from the very lowest to the very highest levels of command, firmly believe in their heart that they will move heaven and earth to get back one of their own. The commitment that General Shelton addresses in the quote above is shared by each and every one of them and is an integral part of their commitment to their Service, its culture and its members. However, conducting any type of recovery of lost personnel behind enemy lines is (and always has been) an extremely difficult and inherently dangerous task. This type of operation has become even more challenging in an asymmetric threat environment where front and rear lines are relative terms; they are either non-existent or vague at best and any American military member or contractor can be caught behind them unaware. At any time, one of our Servicemembers, DOD civilians, or military contractors might end up in the hands of an enemy who will exploit that American's disadvantage for their advantage. An inability and/or failure to recover a member of the Armed Forces or other Americans serving in theater will deeply and most probably adversely effect the existing political and military situation. Day to day

operations in Kosovo and other areas of the former Yugoslavia yield clear examples of these recent phenomena as reports on the evening news have shown.

An important understanding of E&R missions is that when they are done well, the press or media give them little notice. This was the case in the Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) return of the F-116 and F-16 pilots during the Serbian bombing campaign.<sup>1</sup> However, when a force is unable to recover one of their own during a CSAR attempt, the implications (because of press and media coverage) have international repercussions. For instance, the enemy's capture of CWO Michael Durant and the dragging of the bodies of his crew through the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia by a unruly mob, for all the world to see on TV had an immediate and lasting impact on the senior leaders of our country and their strategic decision making.<sup>2</sup>

The current critical interagency coordination, doctrine, training, mission execution and inherent disconnects between other agencies and Department of Defense agencies are issues of concern that require addressing now. A clear understanding of the problems, identification of possible solutions, and implementation of those solutions will help prevent the ugly and tragic Vietnam POW-MIA issue that still exists today, thirty years after the end of that war.

It should be noted that the author understands completely that each of the combatant CINCs obviously knows that they are charged with the responsibility, should deterrence fail, of fighting and winning our nation's wars, in their area of responsibility (AOR). More specifically, Joint Pub 0-2, dated 24 February 1995, clearly states that they have the authority to organize and employ forces as necessary for the accomplishment of any assigned missions. This includes E&R operations in their AOR.

Additionally, of all combatant CINCs, the Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) has the best-equipped and trained units for personnel recovery operations. The USCINCSOC's mission as a supporting CINC requires that he support theater CINCs with forces that are focused on missions deep behind enemy lines. These forces have to be ready to evade capture and assist in their recovery on a moment's notice if they are compromised on their operation/mission.<sup>3</sup>

Having stated that, all CINCs face difficult challenges in the area of E&R of their forces and any other Americans who might find themselves behind enemy lines or stranded away from their parent unit. How prepared they are for the full spectrum of recovery operations is a crucial aspect of solving their dilemma.

## **HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

Historical anecdotes of E&R operations gives us a better picture of how we arrived at this point and the possible direction of future CSAR operations. History is replete with examples showing that in every conflict America has fought overseas, senior leaders have faced the difficult decision of what to do when Servicemembers become separated from their units. Bosnia's successful personnel recoveries and the Somalia experience are just two examples of GIs who, finding themselves behind enemy lines and separated from their comrades, then had to try to evade capture and get back to their units.

In the First World War, then Major William J. ("Wild Bill") Donovan turned out his entire unit to search for and recover two of his soldiers who failed to return from a patrol. As Donovan emphatically stated, "...so each man would know, however mean and despicable he was, if lost in the performance of his duty we would go after him."<sup>4</sup> This commitment framed the basis of his attitude in the future. Later, in the Second World War, Donovan would form the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) which became a principal proponent of how to conduct business behind enemy lines, including evading capture and recovery.<sup>5</sup>

A successful example of E&R during the Second World War came to light in an interview conducted by the author on October 9, 1999 during the reunion of the World War II 454<sup>th</sup> Bombardment Group (Heavy). WWII ex-Flight Officer Dave Millington, whose B-24 had been shot down over Albania, was asked about his experience and then about his prior training and preparation for evading and recovery. It became readily apparent how little of the information and doctrine the OSS had on evasion was disseminated to our pilots. When queried about what help and training he had been given, Millington answered "none". Millington did allow that the word among flight crews was that if you made it safely down, either by parachute or crash landing, you were to go to the high mountains, avoid bridges and cities, and move only at night heading north. Millington's survival kit consisted of four dextrose tablets and the clothes on his back. Further pressed for his story of successful evasion and eventual recovery, he said that his upbringing on a farm during the Depression was a major factor in why he made it back. The deprivation he and his family went through during that period hardened and conditioned him to do without those day-to-day items others take for granted. (It is interesting to note that the forces he eventually linked up with were Serbian and that they moved him to a clandestine airfield where a C-47 landed and met him and several other aviators of whose presence he had been totally unaware.)<sup>6</sup>

Further research of personnel recovery revealed an outstanding example of a major successful recovery operation conducted by special operations forces during World War II. The mission occurred in the Pacific Theater late in the war. Strategic intelligence indicated that a large number of allied prisoners being held in the Cabanatuan prisoner camp on Luzon, in the Philippines were scheduled for execution by their Japanese guards. Elements from the 6<sup>th</sup> Ranger Battalion conducted a successful and daring dawn raid against the camp, killing many of the guards and freeing the prisoners. This well executed and daring mission set a precedent for all future recovery operations.<sup>7</sup>

Later, Korea and Vietnam provided examples of both how well and how poorly the recovery business of evaders and POWs was conducted. Hundreds of American Servicemen owe their lives to the dedicated and heroic efforts of CSAR elements from each of the Services involved. These operations often varied in scope and complexity and were always risky.<sup>8</sup>

A successful example of E&R during the Korean conflict occurred in late March 1951 when a behind the lines direct action mission conducted by Major Ellery Anderson of the British Army, two Americans and four Koreans went awry. When Anderson's team contacted their base for extraction, they were told that the recovery aircraft were unavailable. That meant moving through enemy territory where

they had very little cover and concealment, occasionally crisscrossing paths with the enemy searching for them. The continuous, dangerous and demanding pressure of constantly being on the move with diminished rations took a toll on the team. Two of the Korean soldiers were lost trying to get food from a local village. Eventually the team was given a new rendezvous, and two helicopters with fighter escort extracted them safely while under heavy North Korean pressure.<sup>9</sup>

In Vietnam, the best examples of evasion and recovery were those of the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Studies and Observations Group (SOG) cross-border reconnaissance teams. These teams conducted hundreds of successful missions deep behind enemy lines and were often extracted while evading and under fire by the enemy.<sup>10</sup> Their lessons learned along with tactics, techniques, and procedures for operational E&R are useful even today.

Sadly, after the Korean and Vietnam conflicts ended, thousands of other American POWs and MIAs remain classified as missing and unaccounted for.<sup>11</sup> As a result of the controversy surrounding this issue, the U.S. Government provided direct oversight and established JTF Full Accounting in order to assist in the recovery of military personnel remains.

Operations conducted since the end of the Vietnam conflict have yielded better results. No known evaders/ POWs were left behind or unaccounted for after operations in Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, or the former Yugoslavia. Of note is the fact that the best outcomes in all evasion stories were those of forces specially prepared for that event, should it occur.<sup>12</sup>

In contrast, the capture and subsequent execution of Marine Lieutenant Colonel Higgins by terrorists in Lebanon in the 1980s is a stark reminder that Americans in uniform, even under the "protection" of a blue UN beret, on a peaceful observer mission, can be taken at gunpoint almost anywhere and at any time. The news video image of that dead Marine hanging by his neck is indelibly etched on the minds of all Americans who saw it and remains a lesson for everyone involved in the commitment of American Forces.

Until recently, governmental agency responsibility for missing persons of any category was confusing and disjointed. Past efforts by interagency working groups have helped lead to increased intervention by Congress and recent changes in DOD.<sup>13</sup>

## **AGENCY RESPONSIBILITY**

In a 1999 message sent worldwide to all U.S. forces, Deputy Secretary of Defense for POW / Missing Personnel Affairs, Mr. Robert L. Jones, stated:

During the past year, we [DOD] embarked on an intense effort to improve DOD's personnel recovery capability, the first comprehensive approach to a process that is paramount to reducing the number of unaccounted-for during any future conflicts. Our goal is to create a fully integrated personnel recovery architecture that ensures the recovery of U.S. personnel worldwide, who [may be] isolated and find themselves in harm's way. Personnel recovery is now a high priority within the Department and the interagency community.

Collectively, I wish to communicate clearly to all with whom we work that the U.S. Government is firmly committed to ensure continuation of this effort to locate, account for, and repatriate Americans captured or missing as a result of past, current and future hostile actions...

As recently as Monday, 31 January 2000, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy signed Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 2310.5. The title of this DODI is "Accounting for Missing Persons" and clearly outlines DOD procedures for handling missing persons as a result of hostile actions. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) is now established as principle agent for E&R operations and has three areas of responsibility under the Missing Persons Act, Title 10, United States Code Sections 1501-1413. First, the SECDEF must create within the Department an office having responsibility for missing persons (including evaders). Additionally, he or she must establish policies throughout Department of Defense (DOD) for personnel recovery (including search, rescue, escape, and evasion). Lastly, the SECDEF has to describe uniform DOD policies that cover the full spectrum of missing persons, their recovery and repatriation.<sup>14</sup>

Within DOD are its sub-agencies: the Joint Service SERE (Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape) Agency, the military departments and their Armed Forces components. Each of these elements and their Service components has an area of interest and responsibility regarding evasion and recovery.<sup>15</sup>

Also, each of the various military departments also has responsibility for the training of their respective forces in E&R.<sup>16</sup> For instance, the U.S. Air Force runs a series of SERE exercises for its aircrews called "Woodland Cougar" out of Fairchild AFB (near Spokane, Washington) as a part of its school located there. The U.S. Army has a SERE school located near and on Ft. Bragg. That school is part of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, which has responsibility for training Army Special Operations Forces, less Special Operations Aviation (SOA) and Rangers. The Navy Department has the Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group – Atlantic (FASOTRAGRULANT), Detachment Brunswick.<sup>17</sup> Graduates of these schools know that the schools are narrowly focused on the business of ground operations of evaders in a non-permissive scenario and not focused on the higher headquarters' larger issue of how and when to recover.

Outside of DOD, other agency involvement includes Department of State (DOS), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). Each of their roles and missions in E&R vary based on their mission in a war or Operations Other Than War (OOTW) scenario.<sup>18</sup>

It is important to note that coordination between the agencies outside of DOD and DOD itself is and has been *ad hoc* because of a lack of formal E&R guidance from the Executive Branch. This lack of direction is a major issue when timeliness is essential during an identified personnel recovery crisis.<sup>19</sup> A Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) or national policy written by the National Security Council (NSC), in

coordination with other agencies will alleviate many of the problems currently involving interagency cooperation and direction.<sup>20</sup> In other words, it will put everyone on the same sheet of music.

The quicker the response time, in conjunction with better interagency cooperation, the more likely the chances of success as evidenced during Operation Allied Force and the recoveries of Vega 31 and Hammer 34. These successful operations involved quick responses by United States European Command (USEUCOM) CSAR elements in recovering pilots downed in the former Republic of Yugoslavia.<sup>21</sup>

An understanding of the vocabulary or *lingo* used when discussing evasion and recovery operations is important. Within the interagency community confusion exists over what terms are used and their particular meaning.<sup>22</sup>

## TERMINOLOGY

Within the various agencies of the U.S. Government there exist numerous terms and acronyms dealing with E&R. For clarity, the umbrella terms and phrases are more easily understood than others are and those will be used in this paper. However, note that all the DOD missing person's terminology deals with recovery operations in war and operations other than war. For instance, the term search and rescue (SAR) is generally associated with a permissive environment and the majority of normal SAR missions occur on a daily basis in the U.S.A. using the U.S. Coast Guard, a non-DOD agency.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, the term combat search and rescue (CSAR) takes on an entirely different meaning and deals with recovery in a non-permissive environment. It is generally associated with wartime and contingency operations and is currently considered a collateral mission of Special Operations Forces (SOF).<sup>24</sup>

*Evasion and Recovery* is a specific and universally accepted term. DOD defines it as every aspect of operations associated with personnel on the ground evading capture, those forces working to recover them, and planners putting the mission and associated activities together in a coordinated manner. Any Servicemember avoiding capture by a hostile force is either an escapee or evader. A successful end state is determined as the quick return, from enemy or hostile territory, of our personnel and their subsequent return to a parent unit.<sup>25</sup>

All E&R operations relating to U.S. Armed Forces personnel involve five distinct and important tasks that are consistent and clearly defined in doctrinal publications throughout DOD and other concerned agencies. While these tasks seem intuitively obvious, each entails a great deal of coordination and effort if they are to be successful. The first task is *report*. Timeliness of reporting is essential and must be done in accordance with established personnel recovery formats. Reporting must be accurate and quickly disseminated. The second task is *locate*. Any agency involved with recovery must know where the evader is in order to facilitate recovery. The CINCs will decide which asset they will use for recovery based largely on where the evader is located. *Support* is the third task. Once located, all appropriate assets must be available for recovery. Support may involve interagency coordination. The fourth task is *recover*. This task using available assets and capabilities acceptable to the National

Command Authorities (NCA). Based on a given situation the NCA may personally make the decision on manner and time. The fifth and final task is *repatriate*. Once recovered the evader can then be returned to the parent unit or home.<sup>26</sup>

All personnel recovery operations fall into two main categories, conventional and unconventional. Conventional recovery operations include SAR, CSAR and unassisted recovery. Unconventional recovery operations are generally covert or clandestine in nature and are usually classified.<sup>27</sup> For that reason, unconventional recovery operations are not discussed in this paper.

The discussion of conventional recovery operations and associated challenges and dilemmas at the strategic level is of concern in each CINCs' theater. Senior leaders at theater level and above must address these concerns and establish priorities for their resolution.

## **CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS**

Having established internal guidance and responsibility for personnel evasion and recovery, DOD and the CINCs are still faced with challenges and dilemmas from the tactical mission execution of E&R through the operational and to strategic level implications of their potential impact. The areas/issues of these fall under the broad categories of Policy and Doctrine, Operations and Training, and Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence. Concerns within each of these areas and recommended possible solutions follow.

### **POLICY AND DOCTRINE**

As the military force structure draws down, heavy reliance on civilian contractors and government civil service employees that are forward deployed is becoming the norm rather than the exception. For example, Brown and Root (civilian contractors working for the U.S. Government) have provided dining facility support for operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti and are now providing the same support in Bosnia. Unless these personnel have had prior experience with some aspect of E&R, there are no current policies or directives on evasion and recovery available for contractors or DOD civilians should they be compromised in a hostile area. Additionally, there are no documents available that define the status of contractors on the battlefield. The chance of capture and detention of DOD civilians and contractors increases as the potential threat to them becomes more asymmetrical and the local area more hostile. If detained with military personnel, the risk of confusion and harm to both increases dramatically because of a significant lack of training by the civilians.<sup>28</sup>

Doing a study of exposure and risk will determine how great the need is for doctrine and policies. At a minimum, any DOD civilian, contractor, other government employee headed into a high-risk environment should be advised of the inherent risk they are assuming and on taking possible precautions for minimizing that risk/danger.

The challenge of dealing with other than military personnel in a hostile area also can be one of their legal statuses. Currently, military personnel are considered as combatants until confinement, at which time they become POWs. If POWs escape they are still considered POWs and are not permitted

involvement as lawful combatants. In contrast, for operations other than war, legal considerations vary from country to country for Servicemembers.<sup>29</sup> However, there do not currently exist any legal definitions or guidelines for non-military personnel who are under a military contract for support operations. The Law of Land Warfare and Geneva/Hague Conventions do cover other civilians as Protected Persons or Dislocated Civilians, Refugees, Evacuees and or Internees.<sup>30</sup> Each CINCs' Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) and those of the JCS have yet to resolve this dilemma.<sup>31</sup>

The legal status of DOD civilians, contractors, and other government employees must be determined prior to the onset of hostilities by the OSD General Counsel in coordination with, or guided by, the NCA. That action then requires immediate dissemination throughout DOD and the interagency community. Any legal determination made by the United States will then need resolution in the World Court of the Hague for other nations to be bound by it. This action then protects and provides legal standing to our citizens working for the military and for other nations' contractors as well.

#### OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

During JCS exercises conducted within the various CINCs' theaters, the only real emphasis on E&R operations is in the special operations community. Army Special Forces units and other SOF assets routinely plan and execute at least one personnel recovery and evasion mission per exercise and continue refresher training throughout each individual Special Operations member's career.<sup>32</sup> Such training and specialized schooling enabled CWO Michael Durant of the 160<sup>th</sup> SOAR to survive his horrendous captivity in Somalia in 1993.<sup>33</sup> The earlier downing of Super Six-One, the first special operations MH-60 shot down, and the subsequent CSAR mission that recovered the survivors demonstrated the complexity and danger that are a part of that type of mission.<sup>34</sup> While it is true that men died and expensive equipment was lost in one of the most heroic efforts seen in recent memory, the mission was a declared success. However, the subsequent additional deaths and failure to recover the crew of Super Six-Four, the second downed MH-60, had national military and political fallout that immediately caused the early withdrawal of American forces from Somalia.<sup>35</sup> Discussions with other aviators and conventional force commanders indicate that they have done only the essential internal training and not the necessary follow-on joint/special operations training required for success in a similar situation.<sup>36</sup> This is further validated in the After Action Report of the 1999 DOD Personnel Recovery Conference which stated that, "Very few major exercises exist that have begun to fully implement personnel recovery from planning to execution."<sup>37</sup>

One possible solution is for U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) to fully integrate personnel recovery and evasion scenarios into joint simulations and exercises. Another possibility is that USJFCOM include a personnel recovery brief in the Capstone Course conducted for new General officers.<sup>38</sup> This will instill in the senior leadership the importance of evasion and recovery before they become CINCs.

Code of Conduct courses are given to every military member entering initial entry training. The Code governs actions taken in event a Servicemember becomes a POW and is an essential part of the service culture. Continued training and refresher courses are important and should be ongoing.<sup>39</sup> Other governmental personnel deploying to a theater should also receive Code of Conduct training that will prepare them to resist appropriately in the event of capture and pending recovery.

Joint Doctrine states that "the Joint Search and Rescue Center (JSRC) is a **primary search and rescue facility** suitably staffed by supervisory personnel and equipped for planning, coordinating, and executing joint CSAR operations within the geographical area assigned to the joint force [emphasis in original text]." <sup>40</sup> It is essential that the personnel staffing the facility have the greatest possible experience and training so that they can make informed and timely decisions with appropriate recommendations. Recent experience in joint exercises shows that the staff officers assigned to the JSRC are not sufficiently experienced in CSAR and that training is inadequate.<sup>41</sup> The training of the JSRC and its staff prior to entry into a theater of operations is important because of the impact of their decisions at the senior strategic level.

Identifying the right subject matter experts and earmarking them for training prior to their assignment is a difficult challenge since most will be senior enough to be needed in operations. However, CINCs must make the manning of the JCRC a priority with their component commanders. Service chiefs might task personnel administrators with supplying a special skill identifier for facilitating the process.

#### COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION AND INTELLIGENCE (C3I)

Although DOD has recently issued directives on personnel recovery, as mentioned previously, within DOD the Assistant Secretary of Defense ASD (C3I) has yet to develop the necessary documents for establishing the internal architecture for the CINCs with one exception. USCENTCOM has an approved C3I document tailored for its theater.<sup>42</sup> The other CINCs need the same for their theaters. It is especially important that USEUCOM be supported in its effort because of the ongoing Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) in the areas of Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia.

At the national level, DPMO has reported that "the DOD Intelligence Coordination Group published [in 1999] the DOD National Intelligence Support Product for Personnel Recovery, which provides the baseline for the [combatant] commands, the theaters, and [Joint Search and Rescue Centers] JSRCs to understand what the intelligence community at the national level can bring into play for specific operations."<sup>43</sup> This recent positive effort has helped dramatically in giving CINCs needed assistance in E&R training and operations. Within the CINCs' staff and their Personnel Recovery Councils however, there is a noticeable lack of participation of intelligence personnel. A look at the attendance rosters of the DOD Personnel Recovery Conferences validates this point.<sup>44</sup>

Without the support of both operators and intelligence personnel closely intertwined in the E&R process there will be an obvious tendency toward a disjointed and ineffectual effort. CINCs and senior

leaders must emphasize the importance of staff coordination that will help ensure success. This action needs to be driven from the top by JPRA and DIA.

With the development of the World Wide Web and Internet capability a vitally important issue has arisen regarding the Code of Conduct (COC). Article Five of the COC requires that upon capture a Servicemember provide only his name, rank, service number and date of birth.<sup>45</sup> This information is also available on their ID card. Using the internet, any enemy holding a prisoner can use that military member's name and service number to find out what unit they are from (World Wide Locator), their home, names of family members, credit rating and a host of other sensitive data. This gives the enemy an important psychological advantage in breaking the will of a POW as well as valuable intelligence.

In earlier years (prior to 1971) service personnel were issued serial numbers by the Service they joined. Today that serial number is their Social Security Number (SSN). DOD should consider going back to issuing unique service numbers. While this might prove a costly administrative burden, it quite possibly prevents a whole realm of other problems (such as those mentioned earlier) from developing. If the linkage of the SSN and service number in the military database is a requirement for valid reasons, then placing the SSN behind a security wall will, at the very least, discourage our potential enemies' computer hackers from obtaining valuable information for use against one of our own.

## CONCLUSION

JCS Pub 3-50.3 states:

Evasion and recovery (E&R) operations are an integral part of military operations. The combatant commanders are responsible for developing plans and requirements to locate, support, recover, and repatriate isolated personnel. E&R operations **improve the effectiveness of United States combat forces by preventing the capture and exploitation of US personnel by an enemy.** E&R operations can be successful in any environment [emphasis in original text].<sup>46</sup>

The national priorities on personnel E&R are high as evidenced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of Defense message sent worldwide recently and as cited previously. Important DOD Directives and Instructions on E&R have been signed and distributed throughout the military departments. Joint Doctrine on E&R is written and published and available for all the Armed Forces. The combat commander's commitment to recovery is also there as evidenced by recent recovery operations in the former Yugoslavia. The challenges facing E&R are clearly identified, along with possible solutions and recommendations.

So what is the dilemma? The real dilemma of E&R is that there is a general consensus by the members of the various personnel recovery agencies that the Joint Staff is overburdened with current operations and issues throughout the world and is unable to focus the necessary attention and effort on E&R.<sup>47</sup> For instance, the current focal point for E&R within the Joint Staff is the J-3 Special Operations Division within the J-33 Current Operations. This office is about two levels down from having an advocate with enough rank for making the necessary changes. It is also focused on immediate and near term problems and their resolution. Unfortunately, this office has neither the staff nor the time for E&R.

The Chairman JCS must appoint a focal point immediately at J-3 level for Evasion and Recovery. This focal point, the J-3 E&R, with appropriate rank, can then coordinate interagency E&R efforts. Using the help of the NSC and other agencies, the J-3 E&R then facilitates all E&R actions and priorities at the various combatant CINCs. Additionally, the J-3 E&R together with USJFCOM can create niches within the JCS Exercises for specific E&R events and training across the Services.

An incontrovertible fact is that wherever and whenever America sends its Servicemembers overseas, they stand a very real chance of being taken hostage or lost in a hostile area. Taking action now might prevent future national tragedies involving civilian contractors, DOD employees, and America's sons or daughters in uniform.

WORD COUNT= 5207



## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>3</sup> Michael McCrann, "Evasion and Escape", Armed Forces Journal, International, (September 1999), 108.
- <sup>4</sup> Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero, Wild Bill Donovan (New York, NY: Times Books, 1982), 44.
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., 525.
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- <sup>7</sup> Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets, (New York, NY: Berkley Books 1983), 144.
- <sup>8</sup> Monika Jensen-Stevenson and William Stevenson, Kiss the Boys Goodbye (New York, NY: Penguin Books 1991), 270.
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- <sup>11</sup> Stevenson and Stevenson, 6. Hastings, 304.
- <sup>12</sup> DPMO, AAR, 29.
- <sup>13</sup> Stevenson and Stevenson, 54.
- <sup>14</sup> Defense Prisoner of War / Missing Personnel Office, "Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction (DODI) 2310.5," 31 January 2000; available from [http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/special/dodi2130\\_5.html](http://www.dtic.mil/dpmo/special/dodi2130_5.html); Internet; accessed 15 February 2000.
- <sup>15</sup> Ibid., 2.
- <sup>16</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Evasion and Recovery Operations, Joint Pub 3-50.3, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 6 September 1996), v.
- <sup>17</sup> DPMO, AAR, 37.
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., 6.
- <sup>19</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>20</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid.

<sup>23</sup> U.S. Coast Guard, The Coast Guardsman's Manual, 4<sup>th</sup> ed., (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1964), 56.

<sup>24</sup> United States Special Operations Command, Special Operations in Peace and War, USSOCOM Pub 1 (Tampa, FL, U.S. Special Operations Command, 25 January 1996), 3-4.

<sup>25</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 March 1994), 176.

<sup>26</sup> United States Special Operations Command, Personnel Recovery, Directive 525-21(Draft), (Tampa, FL, U.S. Special Operations Command, 1 November 1999), 3.

<sup>27</sup> McCrann, 108.

<sup>28</sup> DPMO, AAR, 7.

<sup>29</sup> JCS Pub 3-50.3, vi.

<sup>30</sup> Department of the Army, The Law of Land Warfare, FM 27-10, (Washington, D.C., Department of the Army, 18 July 1956), 98.

<sup>31</sup> DPMO, AAR, 7.

<sup>32</sup> USASOC Directive 525-21 (Draft), A-2.

<sup>33</sup> Kent DeLong and Steven Tuckey, Mogadishu!, Heroism and Tragedy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1994), 53.

<sup>34</sup> Bowdwen, 83.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 331.

<sup>36</sup> LTC Stuart Hamilton, USA and LTC Michael Mudd, USA, discussion with author, 24 February 2000, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

<sup>37</sup> DPMO, AAR, 14.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> JCS Pub 3-50.3, v.

<sup>40</sup> Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Joint Combat, Search and Rescue, Joint Pub 3-50.2, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 January 1996), viii.

<sup>41</sup> DPMO, AAR, 15.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., 12.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid., 34-38.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Lawrence P. Crocker, ed., The Army Officer's Guide, 39<sup>th</sup> ed., (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1977), 21.

<sup>46</sup> JCS Pub 3-50.3, v.

<sup>47</sup> DPMO, AAR, 8.



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